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pendent judiciary and improved access to the court’s jurisdiction was estab-
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1 Introduction 
In 2002, the member states of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), 
one of the world’s largest trading blocs then consisting of Brazil, Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay, enacted a new protocol introducing far-reaching 
institutional reforms to the existing dispute settlement system (DSS).1 Up 
until then, Mercosur’s institutions to resolve disputes had been characterized 
by diplomatic negotiations and the convening of ad hoc tribunals with lim-
ited independence from the member-state governments. The reforms mark 
a significant advance in the legalization of this regional organization: a stand-
ing court with a more independent judiciary and improved access to the 
court’s jurisdiction were established. While the extent of legalization in the 
European Union – the most integrated regional integration scheme of all 
politically – is unmatched by other international or regional organizations, 
Mercosur’s DSS is more legalized than that of NAFTA or ASEAN. Mer-
cosur thus represents an intriguing yet under-researched case of a regional 
organization that has made advances in regional integration over the past 
two decades or so, legalization being a central dimension of this integration 
process. 
In order to account for the push for more legalization in Mercosur, this 
article2 explains why, when, and how states decide to advance the legaliza-
tion of interstate dispute settlement systems. We present a rational institu-
tionalist explanation and develop hypotheses about states’ preferred levels of 
legalization (why), an account of the “timing” of qualitative shifts in legaliza-
tion (when), and the institutional form that legalization decisions take (how).  
We argue that even though the institutions responsible for dispute set-
tlement have not been used very much by litigants since they were enacted, 
Mercosur’s member governments had well-defined agendas to reform the 
existing DSS by the time they came to negotiate the “Olivos Protocol for 
the Solution of Controversies,” which was adopted in 2002. Purposefully 
opting for a more strongly legalized DSS, they had distinctive preferences 
                                                 
1  As of July 2012, Venezuela became the fifth state to be a full member of Mercosur. 
2  Previous versions of this article were presented at the IPSA-ECPR joint conference 
“Whatever Happened to the North–South?” held on 16–19 February 2011 in São 
Paulo, the “Dritte Offene Sektionstagung der Sektion Internationale Politik,” 
DVPW, 6–7 October 2011, Munich, and the Annual Conference of the Interna-
tional Studies Association, San Francisco, USA, 3–6 April 2013. We are indebted to 
Alípio Ferreira da Silva Filho and Anne-Sophie Lockner for their invaluable assis-
tance with our research. We would also like to thank Karen Alter, Lisa Dellmuth, 
Benjamin Engst, Jessica Fortin-Rittberger, Sebastian Krapohl, Tobias Lenz, Tonya 
Putnam, and two anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments and sugges-
tions. 
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about which institutional innovations to install. Taking recourse to contract-
ing theory (Cooley and Spruyt 2009), we argue that the initial legalization 
preferences on the part of the Mercosur states reflect differing levels of 
economic strength and interdependence. The economically “weaker” und 
more vulnerable members, Uruguay and Paraguay, preferred a more legal-
ized DSS because of their anxiety about being dominated by the larger 
member states, Argentina and Brazil, in the actual application or renegotia-
tion of the initial contract. Despite divergent legalization preferences be-
tween these two groups of states, the institutional status quo did not prevail. 
We argue that the demand for a more legalized dispute settlement system 
cannot be accounted for by a change in the preferences of the legalization-
skeptical states (Argentina and Brazil), but rather by a change in their strate-
gy to achieve political and economic objectives. Turning to externality theo-
ry (Mattli 1999a; Mattli and Stone Sweet 2012), we show that the economic 
and financial crisis at the turn of the millennium provided a catalyst for 
change: As governments strove for economic growth and the concomitant 
improvement of their re-election fortunes in a time of crisis, they needed to 
send a costly and credible signal to potential traders and investors that Mer-
cosur integration – and hence measures facilitating transnational exchange – 
would prevail over protectionist policies. Among other steps, reforming the 
existing DSS seemed an apt institutional innovation, since this reform was 
not only a costly signal, but also allowed governments to modify a system 
they had found to be dysfunctional in light of their experience with the set-
tlement of disputes under the status quo. Member-state governments explic-
itly crafted the institutional reforms to account for the unexpectedly high 
transaction costs and distributional consequences of the original DSS. 
Our contribution to the literature on this matter is twofold. Explaining 
the institutional innovations of Mercosur’s DSS builds on and complements 
current comparative accounts on the design of dispute settlement systems 
(Alter 2012; Duina 2006; Koremenos and Betz 2013; Krapohl, Dinkel, and 
Faude 2010; Lenz 2012). It demonstrates how different mechanisms – sig-
naling commitment in crisis situations and updating beliefs to render institu-
tions more functional – interrelate, thereby drawing a nuanced picture of the 
timing and content of reforms. Moreover, we supplement the existing litera-
ture on regional integration in Mercosur. This literature claims, inter alia, that 
its more powerful members – most notably Brazil – employ the integration 
scheme as a mere facade. On the one hand, political elites seek to use re-
gional leadership to underpin their interests within the confines of Mercosur 
(Doctor 2013; Malamud 2011; Montecinos 1996). On the other hand, Mer-
cosur membership is also considered as a means to project power not only 
on the continent, but more widely as well (De Lima and Hirst 2006; Spektor 
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2010; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009). While we do not disagree with these 
arguments, we add some more nuances to this picture. Focusing on one of 
the elements of Mercosur’s institutional structure, viz., the legalization of its 
DSS, we argue that member governments sought to create institutions capa-
ble of mitigating impediments to collective action. Shared concerns about 
the actual distributional consequences of Mercosur’s DSS and the intention 
to signal Mercosur’s longevity to further economic stability were capable of 
superseding regional power asymmetries.  
The paper proceeds as follows. While the ensuing section maps the 
qualitative change of Mercosur’s legalization by applying the typology devel-
oped by Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter (2000), we flesh out our theo-
retical arguments and hypotheses in section 3. We then probe our theoreti-
cal expectations empirically in semi-structured interviews with key officials 
and decision-makers from Mercosur member states and the Mercosur secre-
tariat who were involved in the negotiation of the reforms. To increase the 
reader’s confidence in our findings, we finally conduct a robustness check by 
taking issue with rival explanations and discussing a potential counterfactual. 
2 Mapping the Legalization of Mercosur 
To address the qualitative shift towards a more legalized system of dispute 
settlement in Mercosur, we first introduce the relevant concepts to capture 
legalization and any changes therein. We take recourse to the typology pro-
posed by Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter (2000; also see Stone 1994), 
which distinguishes between two ideal types of conflict-litigation mecha-
nisms, viz., interstate and transnational. This typology presents criteria that 
allow us to describe and compare dispute settlement systems. In a second 
step, we apply this typology to map Mercosur’s DSS in the period before 
and after the reform of 2002. 
2.1 Conceptualizing Legalization 
The explanandum of this paper, the reform of institutions for dispute resolu-
tion in the context of Mercosur, is an instance of legalization. Legalization 
highlights specific formal characteristics of institutions in world politics, 
such as their level of obligation or the delegation of judicial powers to inter-
national courts. We are aware of the limits of the focus on legalization, since – 
contrary to judicialization – legalization eclipses questions about the way in 
which these institutions affect and gradually develop authority over – and 
hence “judicialize” – the production of legislation in Mercosur (see Abbott 
and Snidal 2013 and Stone Sweet 2010 on the concept of judicialization). 
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Nevertheless, we argue that analyses of judicialization are likely to benefit 
from an understanding of the design and change of institutions for dispute 
resolution (legalization) and thus deem our contribution to be relevant to 
this field of study. 
The degree to which dispute settlement systems are legalized varies be-
tween interstate and transnational forms of conflict litigation (Keohane, 
Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000: 457). Systems of interstate conflict litigation 
are characterized by state dominance. They control access to international 
courts or tribunals, designate the arbiters or judges, and control the imple-
mentation of their rulings. In systems of transnational dispute resolution, 
however, states lose their gate-keeping role and hence their control over 
access, process, and enforcement. At the same time, private, transnational 
actors come to play an increasingly important role. To substantiate and 
measure these two types of conflict litigation, Keohane, Moravcsik, and 
Slaughter have introduced three dimensions: independence, access, and 
embeddedness. Independence “specifies the extent to which formal legal 
arrangements ensure that adjudication can be rendered impartially with re-
spect to concrete state interests” (Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000: 
458). We can assess independence by examining the selection and tenure of 
judges or arbitrators, their legal discretion, and their control over the court’s 
resources. The second dimension, access, addresses the question of who has 
standing in an international court. In the case of interstate conflict litigation, 
governments are the only parties to a dispute. At the other end of the spec-
trum, individuals may directly file complaints via national courts. Legal em-
beddedness, the third dimension, refers to the control over the formal im-
plementation of legal decisions. In interstate conflict litigation, member 
states have the possibility to veto awards ex post. In contrast, in systems of 
transnational dispute resolution, domestic courts compel their own govern-
ments to implement and respect international rules and awards. A more 
legalized DSS is thus coterminous with shifts towards a more independent 
DSS with broader access and higher levels of legal embeddedness. 
2.2 Legalization of Mercosur: Before and After the  
Reforms 
Applying the typology used by Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter to Mer-
cosur’s DSS, the reforms enacted in 2002 mark a qualitative shift. While it is 
initially a system characterized by interstate conflict litigation, it progresses 
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towards a more transnational DSS.3 In order to appreciate the changes 
brought about by the Protocol of Olivos in 2002, we need to contrast them 
with the pre-existing DSS, which was laid down in the Protocol of Brasilia in 
1991. 
Beginning with the independence dimension, the reforms of 2002 in-
troduced an independent standing court: the Permanent Review Tribunal. 
While the Protocol of Brasilia knows either interstate forums of dispute 
settlement or ad hoc arbitration with arbiters chosen by the disputing parties 
on a case-by-case basis, the Permanent Review Tribunal is a standing court 
with its own infrastructure and budget. According to the Protocol of Brasil-
ia, interstate conflicts were to be resolved by direct negotiations among the 
parties involved. Should no compromise be reachable, one side alone may 
submit the case to the Common Market Group. This executive body has the 
prerogative to suggest a recommendation, provided that all sides agree. If 
disagreement persists, however, then one of the conflicting parties could call 
for ad hoc arbitration. Ad hoc tribunals consist of three judges: one desig-
nated from each party and a third, jointly selected judge. The judges reach 
their binding verdicts by a majority decision, and the rulings cannot be ap-
pealed. The Protocol of Olivos maintained basic elements from the Protocol 
of Brasilia, yet it introduced a major innovation: the Permanent Review 
Tribunal, composed of five judges, with each member state designating one 
judge for a two-year term that is renewable. The fifth judge is jointly selected 
by mutual accord for a three-year term, which is only renewable if the mem-
ber states come to a unanimous decision. All verdicts are reached by majori-
ty rule. This body may also conduct a judicial review of the decisions made 
by the ad hoc panels. Finally, the Protocol of Olivos offers yet another im-
portant juridical innovation with regard to the legal discretion of the DSS. 
Even though the exact proceedings were left open to later regulation,4 the 
Permanent Review Tribunal may serve to pronounce consultative opinions 
when asked to do so by domestic supreme courts. 
The Olivos reform also brought about changes in the provisions regu-
lating access to Mercosur’s DSS. Access remains unchanged and is only 
indirect for private actors. These can file cases only through their respective 
national delegations to the Common Market Group. But the path for the 
adjudication of member states’ charges has changed with Olivos: the Com-
mon Market Group now merely serves as a forum for conflict litigation if all 
                                                 
3  Our findings are by and large congruent with those of Moraes 2002 and Krapohl, 
Dinkel, and Faude 2010. 
4  The Common Market Council regulated further proceedings with decisions CMC 
37/03 and CMC 02/2007. The Common Market Group adopted resolution CMG 
40/04. 
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the members agree to use this intergovernmental channel for interstate con-
flict resolution. Under the new system, the parties to a dispute now face 
three choices. In the first option, one side may directly call for arbitration in 
ad hoc panels. Second, the Common Market Group may still settle disputes. 
But in contrast to the provisions in the Protocol of Brasilia, all parties need 
to reach a consensus to forward the dispute case to this intergovernmental 
forum. Finally, if all the sides involved consent, they can immediately file the 
case with the Permanent Review Tribunal. Moreover, this body may exercise 
judicial review of the decisions promulgated by the ad hoc panels. The 
Olivos reforms also foreclose “forum shopping”: if the parties subject to the 
dispute agree to employ the Mercosur DSS prior to engaging in litigation, 
they commit themselves to not filing the case in the court of another inter-
national organization (for example, the WTO). 
Likewise, the legal embeddedness of Mercosur’s DSS also underwent a 
transformation. In contrast to the Protocol of Brasilia, the Protocol of 
Olivos explicitly allows for and specifies retaliatory measures. Nonetheless, 
enforcement of the court’s verdicts has not been delegated to national 
courts. Table 1 provides an overview of the described changes. 
Table 1:  Changes in Mercosur’s Dispute Settlement System 
Legalization Protocol of Brasilia (1991) Protocol of Olivos (2002) 
Independence   
Selection & tenure Each conflict party selects 
one ad hoc arbiter 
Third arbiter selected jointly 
Each member state selects 
one tenured judge for the 
Permanent Tribunal 
A fifth judge (with longer 
tenure) is selected jointly 
Legal discretion  Consultative opinion 
Resources Case-by-case ad hoc arbitra-
tion 
Standing court with its own 
budget 
Access Unilateral referral of cases to 
CMG and to ad hoc panels 
Referral of cases to CMG 
only by consent 
Unilateral referral of cases to 
ad hoc tribunals 
Direct referral of cases to 
PRT by consent 
Conflicts need to be settled 
either in Mercosur or WTO 
(choice of forum) 
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Legalization Protocol of Brasilia (1991) Protocol of Olivos (2002) 
Legal embed-
dedness 
Arbiter’s decision independ-
ent from governments’  
No domestic enforcement, 
though 
Arbiter’s/judge’s decision 
independent from govern-
ments’  
No domestic enforcement, 
though  
Detailed regulation of retalia-
tory measures 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
3 Explaining the Reform of Mercosur’s Dispute 
Settlement System 
Before we present some hypotheses to account for the described changes in 
Mercosur’s DSS, we will turn to the assumptions on which our theoretical 
arguments are built. We view the institutions for dispute resolution in world 
politics as rules designed by purposive actors to constrain and shape actors’ 
behavior and to structure the incentives of actors involved in socio-political 
exchange relationships (Mattli 1999a: 9). International institutions represent 
collective outcomes of interdependent (strategic), rational state choices and 
interstate negotiations in an international environment characterized by 
anarchy. We also understand that state actors prefer and propose different 
levels of legalization as a strategy to realize their underlying preferences for 
cooperation. Preferences and strategies are foundational elements in ration-
alist models of social behavior, and both are essential in explaining actors’ 
observed choices (see Rubinstein 1991; Frieden 1999). The first concept, 
preferences, describes the rank order of all the choices an actor has in a given 
environment. The second, strategy, provides guidelines for action in contexts 
with multiple actors (strategic interaction) and lays down the behavioral 
options actors have in order to obtain their preferred outcome (see Frieden 
1999: 41). Devising institutions for dispute resolution in world politics is 
thus not an end in itself, but a means to an end, viz., to achieve particular 
policy objectives. Assuming that actors’ policy preferences are exogenous, 
changes in the preferred level of legalization are expressions of a change in 
strategies: when actors form preferences over institutions, such as the rules 
to settle interstate disputes, they project the effects of alternative institutions 
on policy outcomes and opt for the institutional solution that suits their 
priorities best. Building on these assumptions, a theory of legalization of 
world politics should provide answers to three main questions: How can we 
account for the levels of legalization that states prefer? How can the “tim-
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ing” of a qualitative shift in legalization be explained? And which institu-
tional solutions do actors strive for? 
3.1 Preferences for Legalization 
In order to account for governments’ preferred levels of legalization, we will 
now turn to contracting theory. Following Cooley and Spruyt’s argument, 
both the relative distribution of power among states and the nature of insti-
tutions as incomplete contracts have profound implications on institutional 
design (Cooley and Spruyt 2009). Governments of weaker states tend to be 
anxious about the downstream consequences of international treaties, as 
stronger states may use their superior bargaining leverage to the detriment 
of the former by changing the initial contract in ex post negotiations. In in-
ternational economic governance, state weakness and state strength are 
commonly attributed to the relative size of the economy of a particular 
country and/or levels of trade dependence. States with higher levels of trade 
dependence tend to benefit more from cooperation and are therefore more 
sensitive to the demands of less dependent states, which yield superior bar-
gaining power. In the light of the incomplete contracting problem, less de-
pendent states can instrumentalize their superior bargaining power: Renego-
tiating initial contracts, they can tilt terms in their own favor and thereby 
exacerbate any pre-existing power asymmetries. Weaker states have two 
options to address this challenge: First, weaker states can either demand that 
a complete and hence a very detailed and specific contract be negotiated – 
which renders ex post negotiations less likely and thus circumscribes the 
possibility that stronger states will exploit their superior bargaining power. 
Second, weaker states can press the more powerful states to bind and com-
mit themselves to the jurisdiction of a supranational rule-making and/or 
adjudicatory body. Such “commitment institutions” reduce the possibility 
that the more powerful states will renegotiate the initial contract in their 
own favor. Stronger states, however, tend to prefer incomplete contracts to 
complete ones and view the creation of supranational commitment institu-
tions with skepticism, since these place constraints on the stronger states’ 
opportunities to renegotiate the initial terms of the contract ex post. 
We can deduce from this discussion that, ceteris paribus, high levels of le-
galization are hardest to obtain when power asymmetries among states are 
particularly pronounced. Conversely, modest power asymmetries lead inter-
dependent states to accept incomplete contracts, since anxiety about ex post 
renegotiations is limited. Moreover, modest power asymmetries also increase 
the likelihood that states will accept supranational adjudicatory authority, 
since the threat of domination by stronger partners is much less prevalent. 
Power asymmetries can be mediated by demand for integration. Generally 
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speaking, “[t]he state in which the demand for integration is lower than in 
other states will have bargaining leverage over the actor whose demand for 
integration is high” (Cooley and Spruyt 2009: 154). Legalization is thus most 
likely to progress when power asymmetries are modest and the stronger 
states expect to benefit from integration (see Mattli 1999a and 1999b). In 
turn, stark power asymmetries and weak demand on behalf of the stronger 
states will be least conducive to legalization. 
Hypothesis 1: Stronger states tend to be less in favor of legalization, 
while weaker states will demand international commitment institu-
tions or complete contracts that are closely specified. The more 
modest the power asymmetries are, the more likely it is that states 
will agree on commitment institutions and hence advances in legali-
zation. 
3.2 Timing and Content of Legalization 
Under what conditions do actors with potentially non-congruous prefer-
ences for legalization opt for institutional reforms leading to further legaliza-
tion? Moreover, what kind of institutional innovations do they strive for? 
We argue that the presence of two mechanisms is necessary to account for 
the timing and content of institutional reforms. First, external events can 
transform the strategic environment for regional cooperation and result in 
changes in actors’ strategies and displayed bargaining positions. Against the 
backdrop of a different context for social interaction, actors may find their 
initial strategy leading to less than optimal outcomes. Governments may 
then modify their strategies and may seek more legalized forms of dispute 
resolution, even though their underlying preferences remain unchanged. 
Second, political actors devise institutions on the grounds of imperfect in-
formation. Since the transaction costs and distributional consequences of 
institutions become apparent only once these institutions are in use, gov-
ernments update initially held beliefs when they rely on them. They press for 
revision in case the institutions do not serve to coordinate social interaction 
in line with actors’ expectations. 
Theories regarding international cooperation based on the notion of in-
terdependence (see Keohane 1984 and Pollack 1997) have been criticized 
for overlooking the fact that demand for cooperation and institutions alone 
does not automatically lead to institutional change; it takes political leader-
ship to adopt and eventually translate demands for institutional change into 
policy (Mattli 1999a: 12). Turning thus to political leadership and the key 
role executive actors play in multilateral negotiations, we have to ask under 
what conditions governments are able and willing to press for institutional 
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change. It can be argued that political leaders a priori value political survival 
and the resulting ability to craft policies in line with the preferences of their 
constituents. Effective self-government can be best achieved if the domestic 
economy is prosperous (Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, and Lafay 1991; Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1995; Duch and Stevenson 2008). Political leaders thus evaluate 
schemes for international cooperation and integration with regard to the 
benefits they provide: Does international cooperation enhance the likeli-
hood of staying in office and implementing desired political agendas? Like 
Mattli, we would expect that  
economically successful leaders are unlikely to pursue deeper integra-
tion because their expected marginal benefit from integration in terms 
of improved re-election chances […] is minimal and thus not worth 
the cost of integration (Mattli 1999a: 12).  
If the economy is in dire straits, however, the calculations of political leaders 
may be different. Economic crises change governments’ strategic environ-
ment, and political survival turns out to be increasingly uncertain. To ensure 
their odds of being re-elected are good enough, political leaders may revise 
their strategies. Deepening regional cooperation and integration may be one 
way of working towards this objective (Mattli 1999a).  
While this argument is supposed to hold for all countries equally, we 
suggest that governments in emerging markets face somewhat different 
economic challenges than economically developed states for which the sta-
bilization of the domestic economy via more intraregional trade is a central 
issue. Foreign direct investments play a significant role in stimulating eco-
nomic growth in developing countries: the creation of productive capacity 
and the transfer of knowledge and technology are particularly salient to 
promote endogenous growth (see de Mello 1997; Borensztein, Gregorio, 
and Lee 1998). Governments are thus eager to offer potential investors, 
such as multinational companies, favorable conditions in order to attract 
foreign direct investments and secure their positive externalities (see Mar-
gheritis and Pereira 2007; Lagendijk and Hendricx 2009). In times of eco-
nomic crises, governments tend to be extraordinarily susceptible to this 
rationale, since they have to send signals to international capital owners with 
the intention of stimulating the inflow of capital. For such a signal to be 
credible, it has to come at some cost to the sender (see Akerlof 1970 and 
Fearon 1997). Legalization and the establishment of courts that can solve 
disputes in international economic governance provide such a credible and 
costly signal. Since legalization implies that the actors delegate sovereignty 
and hence are willing to tie their own hands, self-binding institutional mech-
anisms underpin governments’ firm commitment to cooperation (Goldstein 
and Gowa 2002; Alter 2008; Simmons and Danner 2010). By increasing legal 
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certainty for transnational actors who trade within a regional bloc, their 
belief in sustained market-liberal reforms is reinforced (Lipson 1985; Frie-
den and Martin 2002; Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006; Büthe and Mil-
ner 2008). 
We follow Mattli in accounting for the timing and the direction of le-
galization in the context of developing countries and emerging markets 
(Mattli 1999a and 1999b). In times of economic crisis, governments are 
more willing to concede sovereignty to signal favorable conditions to trans-
national socio-economic actors. Even economically stronger states that are 
less trade-dependent within the region may thus accommodate demands for 
higher levels of legalization in the face of uncertain economic conditions. 
Hypothesis 2: In times of economic crises, the legalization of dis-
pute settlement systems signals governments’ commitment to eco-
nomic cooperation and economic integration to transnational eco-
nomic actors and investors. 
While economic crises may serve as catalysts for legalization, the institution-
al form and design of legalization requires further exploration. Actors devise 
political institutions under conditions of uncertainty and rely on previous 
experience and available information to craft them. Once institutions are in 
place, actors gradually learn about the effect of the rules they initially creat-
ed. Following a functionalist line of reasoning, we argue that new evidence 
changes rational actors’ original beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships 
(Meseguer 2006; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006; Dobbin, Simmons, 
and Garrett 2007; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008; Gilardi 2010). Actors 
make use of this new information and re-evaluate whether the means, i.e., 
the institutions in place, are propitious to serve the desired ends. In practice, 
actors may need a considerable period of experimentation (trial and error) 
before they can find rules that generate the outcomes they expected from 
their institutional choices (Ostrom 1998). Contract theory stresses the im-
portance of rational learning for the design of dispute settlement systems 
(Cooley and Spruyt 2009: 37). When facing or involved in a dispute, gov-
ernment officials update initially held beliefs about the distributional conse-
quences of the existing DSS. Those who make use of the DSS can thus learn 
that the original design either fits or does not fit their purposes: the transac-
tion costs entailed in litigation may either be considered too high or the 
litigation outcomes may distribute the gains in different ways than actors 
assumed ex ante. In the light of better information, actors may then recon-
sider and strive to modify their initial strategy. Such an updating of prior 
beliefs not only leads to expectations about the timing of reforms, but it also 
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allows us to account for the character of the innovations and the actors who 
are most likely to press for the rules to be changed.5 
Hypothesis 3: If governments learn that an existing dispute settle-
ment system produces unexpected transaction costs or distribution-
al effects, they readily adapt their strategies and press for the terms 
of the contract to be renegotiated. 
We show below that both factors – the occurrence of an economic crisis as 
well as the institutions’ unexpected distributional consequences – are neces-
sary factors in explaining the timing and character of reforms to Mercosur’s 
DSS. The first explanation highlights the issue of timing and the push to-
wards more transnational modes of dispute resolution. It suggests that in 
times of economic crises, governments use legalization to signal to investors 
that they are committed to upholding or even advancing the conditions for 
intraregional trade and investment. The second explanation, which rests on 
the notion of updating initially held beliefs about institutional effects, con-
tributes to our understanding of the timing and content of legalization deci-
sions. Governments are disposed to change institutions after they have 
learned about the unforeseen consequences of the initial design. Having 
experienced the workings of an institution in sufficient detail, they possess 
better information to evaluate the institutions’ impact and may devise im-
provements accordingly.  
3.3 Observable Implications 
What are the empirical implications of these theoretical considerations in the 
case of Mercosur? Our first hypothesis suggests that the economically more 
dependent states of the trade bloc, Uruguay and Paraguay, should press 
most strongly for “commitment institutions” and hence higher levels of 
legalization to prevent domination from the economically more powerful 
states, i.e., Argentina and Brazil. We have assessed the relative levels of in-
terdependence by comparing the average yearly intra-Mercosur trade shares 
of the four member states since Mercosur’s founding year (1991) and the 
termination of negotiations for the Protocol of Olivos (2001). According to 
the trade data presented in Figure 1, Brazil and Argentina display moderate 
levels of interdependence at best. We would thus not expect these countries 
                                                 
5  Even though functional accounts of institutions easily run the risk of being tauto-
logical, rational design choices imply that actors always take decisions purposefully. 
They first identify the problems with the original institutions and, in a second step, 
seek to devise institutions that will solve their problems with the information avail-
able. Circular reasoning is thus no longer a theoretical issue, but is reduced to a 
measurement problem. 
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to be among the prime candidates pushing for modifications in Mercosur’s 
DSS. As for the two smallest economies in the region, Uruguay and Para-
guay, the situation is different. Compared with Brazil in particular, intrare-
gional trade is very important as a share of their overall trade. We would 
therefore expect the two smaller Mercosur members to be most in favor of 
further legalization. 
Figure 1: Intraregional Commodity Trade between 1991 and 2001. Imports 
and Exports as Mean Yearly Trade Shares of Regional Trade Rela-
tive to Overall Trade 
 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. Data from ECLAC. 
Following the second hypothesis, we also expect that two interlinked exter-
nal events should make governments reconsider their initial positions on 
Mercosur’s DSS. The economic and financial crisis in South America at the 
turn of the millennium had particularly strong repercussions on the Argen-
tinian and Brazilian economies, and we would expect those economies that 
suffered most from the crises to press hardest for institutional reform. Ar-
gentina and Brazil should be prime candidates for signaling their commit-
ment to regional integration in general and legal security for economic in-
vestments in particular. 
With regard to the third hypothesis, we argued that actors learn about 
the effects of a DSS once they make use of the system to settle conflicts. 
Mercosur’s member states employed ad hoc panels to solve interstate con-
flicts for the first time in 1998. Up to the end of the negotiations about the 
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reform of Mercosur’s DSS in December 2001, Argentina was involved in 
five cases, Brazil in four, and Uruguay in one.6 Since they are the two coun-
tries with the highest share of cases, we would thus expect governments and 
officials from Argentina and Brazil to be particularly susceptible to revising 
their beliefs about the consequences of Mercosur’s DSS. We hence expect 
that their reform agenda and their proposals will be driven by the experienc-
es drawn from the workings of the initial institutional design. 
4 The Legalization of Mercosur: The Empirical 
Record 
In order to explain the legalization of Mercosur and to empirically inform 
the hypotheses presented above, we collected enough primary source data to 
provide first-hand insights into the negotiations concerning the Protocol of 
Olivos. The treaties and amending protocols have already been interpreted 
at length in the legal literature, but scholarship unveiling the political process 
of the negotiations is rare, given the lack of systematically collected primary 
source data.7 Diplomatic documents covering the negotiations remain classi-
fied, and despite our efforts to obtain them, government and Mercosur 
officials were reluctant to grant us access. In spotlighting actors who were 
closely involved in the negotiations of the Protocol of Olivos, we identified 
theoretically interesting groups of actors (George and Bennett 2005; Tansey 
2007). We interviewed members of government, ministry officials involved 
in the negotiations, a representative of an influential interest group with a 
particular focus on trade relations within Mercosur, and members of aca-
demia (especially lawyers) with close ties to relevant political actors. Overall, 
we consulted three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, nine officials from other 
domestic ministries, five fonctionnaires working for Mercosur institutions, 
seven academics, and one representative from an interest group.8 Five inter-
viewees come from Argentina, six from Brazil, three from Paraguay, and 
four from Uruguay. Altogether, eighteen interviews were conducted be-
tween February and March 2011. These were semi-structured and explicitly 
designed to tap the key explanatory concepts identified in our theoretical 
                                                 
6  This data was taken from Mercosur’s Secretariat’s website: <www.mercosur.int>; 
last accessed in October 2013. 
7  Some legal texts contain remarks on particular positions of countries on the ques-
tion of legalization. See, for example, Perotti 2001, Boldorini 2003, Garabelli 2004, 
and Pimentel and de Klor 2004. 
8  Some of our interview partners belonged to more than one of these groups, which 
is why the number does not add up to 18. 
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discussion: the sources of governments’ preferences, the rationale for chang-
ing strategies, and associated behaviors in the course of the negotiations 
between 2000 and 2002. 
4.1 Strong States, Weak States, and Different  
Preferences Regarding Legalization 
Turning to the empirical record, our findings on states’ initial preferences 
regarding legalization offer support for our first hypothesis. While the gov-
ernments of Uruguay and Paraguay both expressed their support for higher 
levels of legalization at an early stage, Argentina and Brazil favored the insti-
tutional status quo. According to our interviewees, concerns among officials 
from Uruguay and Paraguay about the larger states’ superior bargaining 
power and anxiety about renegotiations of the initial bargain were pro-
nounced: “It’s the failure to fulfill obligations, the lack of sanctions, and the 
impunity that the larger countries enjoy,” one government official from 
Uruguay said.9 Opting for a more legalized DSS in Mercosur appeared an 
apt way of restricting larger partners: “It’s always the smaller states that 
worry most about a good system of dispute resolution.”10 A government 
official from Paraguay exemplified Paraguay’s problems with Brazil:  
Brazil, for example, used to create problems with the export of some 
of our products that should get freely into Brazil. Well, this meant a 
really big impediment for the Paraguayan economy. On the other 
hand, if Paraguay took similar measures to avoid entrance of some 
similar products from Brazil into Paraguay, you see the difference be-
tween the Paraguayan and Brazilian economies. It mattered very little 
for Brazil.11  
The position of the smaller states was echoed by officials from Argentina 
and Brazil, who underlined that “supranationality” appeared to be the natu-
ral way out for the weaker states, because it allows them to bind their part-
ners to commonly devised rules.12 In contrast, the two larger countries pre-
ferred a more state-centric and intergovernmental setting to resolve dis-
putes. A government official from Paraguay nicely highlights the different 
dynamics of interaction between a diplomatic and a legalized forum for 
resolving disputes:  
                                                 
9  Authors’ interview 13, Montevideo, February 2011. 
10  Authors’ interview 14, Uruguay, government official, Montevideo, March 2011. 
11  Authors’ interview 17, Paraguay, ministry official, Asunción, March 2011. 
12  Authors’ interview 2, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011; and authors’ 
interview 3, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011. 
 The Legalization of Dispute Resolution in Mercosur 17 
 
Large countries prefer to avoid controversies being resolved by a tri-
bunal. It’s more convenient to keep the question in a diplomatic dis-
cussion where they can exercise political pressure. Because once it 
goes to the tribunal, the pressure from the countries can’t exist any-
more – theoretically, at least.13  
Brazil was particularly “afraid to be bound by law”14 and intended to avoid a 
supranational tribunal throughout the negotiations leading to the adoption 
of the Protocol of Olivos.15 In February 1997, Brazil’s vice-president Mar-
cos Marciel de Oliveira affirmed in a speech before Paraguay’s National 
Congress that the institutions in place were satisfactory as they were:  
Governments as well as private initiatives, businessmen, companies, 
and citizens can call upon the dispute settlement system whenever 
and however often they consider it necessary. […] Our institutions 
have produced excellent results so far and will render the adoption of 
models that do not correspond to our necessities and common expe-
riences obsolete in the end (cited in Garabelli 2004: 184. Authors’ 
own translation).  
According to the logic of the larger states, departing from a consensus-based 
system of resolving disputes would create a fiction that smaller partners are 
equal to their larger partners and thus equip them with a disproportionate 
share of power (Taccone and Nogueira 2001; Barral 2003).  
4.2 The Shift Towards Legalization: Signaling  
Commitment to Integration in Times of Crisis 
We have shown that in the period preceding the negotiations of the Proto-
col of Olivos, Paraguay and Uruguay favored higher levels of legalization 
while the governments of Argentina and Brazil preferred the status quo. The 
crucial question to be answered in this section is why Argentina and Brazil 
agreed to engage in negotiations on a permanent dispute settlement mecha-
nism. In light of the economic and financial crisis besetting the continent in 
the latter part of the 1990s, Mercosur’s governments supported institutional 
reforms towards a more legalized DSS to signal their commitment to the 
regional integration project, aiming to secure a prosperous economic envi-
ronment capable of attracting intraregional and, in particular, extraregional 
investments. It is often argued that the economic crises in Brazil in 1999 and 
                                                 
13  Authors’ interview 17, Paraguay, ministry official, Asunción, March 2011. 
14  Authors’ interview 13, Uruguay, government official, Montevideo, February 2011. 
15  Authors’ interview 1, Brazil, ministry official, São Paulo, February 2011; and au-
thors’ interview 2, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011. 
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in Argentina in 2000 marked the end of Mercosur’s “golden decade” during 
the 1990s (Bouzas 2001; Quijano 2005; Gomez-Mera 2009). While the crises 
initially led to protectionist reflexes and increased distrust among member 
states (Gomez-Mera 2013: 6), governments decided at a meeting of the 
Common Market Council in Buenos Aires in June 2000 to respond not by 
abandoning the regional integration project, but by relaunching it. They 
intended to revive Mercosur’s “spirit” and regain the support of the business 
sector with a number of policy decisions and institutional innovations, in-
cluding the reform of the DSS (Taccone and Nogueira 2002; de Klor 2003; 
Malamud 2005; Vinuesa 2005; decision CMC 65/00). 
Documentary evidence on the negotiations and our own interview data 
offer insights into the rationales that drove the Argentinian and Brazilian 
governments to change their strategies (not preferences) and commit them-
selves to further legalization as a response to the crisis. During the 1990s, 
Mercosur’s DSS was often criticized for being dysfunctional. Not only aca-
demics, but also politicians from outside the region and actors from other 
regional integration schemes, such as the EU, took the non-existence of a 
permanent dispute settlement system as proof of its defective institutional 
design.16 The member governments’ decision to engage in renegotiations of 
the Protocol of Brasilia were part of a larger campaign that sought to reach 
out to international and domestic actors and revise that image:17  
There was this idea of sending a message to the international commu-
nity that Mercosur was going to continue to exist. We thought that 
the clearest message would go through the institutionalization of 
Mercosur. And one of the topics that always concerned not only Mer-
cosur, but also all those that looked at the bloc, was the topic of re-
solving controversies.18  
One ministry official from Brazil, the largest member of Mercosur, empha-
sized the importance of reaching employers and entrepreneurs from within 
the region:  
                                                 
16  Authors’ interview 12, Uruguay, ministry official, Montevideo, February 2011; and 
Lehmann 2001. 
17  As Gomez-Mera 2009 shows, the years 2000 and 2001 were marked by particularly 
ardent trade disputes between Mercosur’s members. Negotiating a more legalized 
dispute settlement mechanism and engaging in trade wars seems puzzling. But as 
interviewee 15, a ministry official from Brazil, pointed out in Brasilia in 2011, nego-
tiations about the dispute settlement mechanism would advance more easily in the 
shadow of this turmoil: “It was difficult to talk about economic issues themselves 
due to protectionist reflexes from the authorities. […] It was easier to advance on 
the institutional side than on the economic one due to the crises.”  
18  Authors’ interview 8, Paraguay, government official, Asunción, February 2011. 
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At the end of the 1990s, Argentina complained a lot about what they 
called ‘Brazil dependence,’ and when Brazil devalued its currency, it 
had a big impact on them. […] So they [the Brazilian politicians] had 
the idea of addressing the employers, entrepreneurs, and governments 
of these countries and telling them that Mercosur was going to re-
sume its growth path.19 
Governments were particularly eager to stress legal certainty and stability 
within the region (de Klor 2003; Fontoura 2003 and Vinuesa 2005). Martin 
Redrado, a leading Argentinian politician at the time, announced: “[T]he 
main idea was to improve the existing judicial system in the conviction that 
the new one would offer greater guarantees to its participants” (cited in de 
Klor 2003: 624. Authors’ own translation). Concerns about legal security 
were so prominent that they even found their way into the preamble of the 
Protocol of Olivos: governments were “convinced of the necessity to im-
prove the dispute settlement system such that it consolidates legal certainty 
in Mercosur” (Protocol of Olivos, preamble. Authors’ own translation). 
4.3 Learning from Experience: Reducing the  
Transaction Costs of Litigation 
While the economic crisis can be seen as a catalyst for deepening integration 
and legalization, the reform of the DSS was placed on the agenda as a result 
of perceived problems with the institutional status quo. Argentina and Brazil 
began to make use of Mercosur’s DSS for the first time at the end of the 
1990s. Between 1998 and the end of negotiations concerning the Protocol 
of Olivos in 2001, Mercosur’s larger countries settled their first four disputes 
according to the rules of the Protocol of Brasilia. Government officials and 
ministry officials from both sides came to the conclusion that the status quo 
of Mercosur’s DSS entailed distributional consequences and transaction 
costs for litigation that were higher than initially anticipated. 
The Argentinian government began to reconsider its stance on the Pro-
tocol of Brasilia in the light of losing the cases brought before the second 
and third ad hoc tribunal.20 The results “led the Argentinians to believe that 
there was a need for a second instance to give the country another chance to 
argue against the decision.”21 Apart from mentioning the unintended distri-
bution of gains flowing from the rulings, interviewees from the administra-
                                                 
19  Authors’ interview 2, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011. 
20  Authors’ interview 10, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011; 
authors’ interview 3, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011; and Perotti 
2001. 
21  Authors’ interview 15, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, March 2011. 
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tive ranks highlighted their disappointing experience with the litigation pro-
cedure itself: “We, the experts – the ones who work in the ‘kitchen’ and 
prepare the cases and their defense – had realized that Brasilia was full of 
flaws.”22 Apparently, the Argentinians had learned that the current institu-
tional design required reforms to reduce the transaction costs involved in 
litigation: “What all countries agreed on was that we needed a system that 
was effective, fast, as agile as possible, and not very costly.”23 It was with the 
fourth dispute brought before an ad hoc tribunal – the so-called “poultry 
case” between Argentina and Brazil – that the willingness to reconsider 
Mercosur’s DSS was sparked off (Vinuesa 2005). Brazil, Mercosur’s largest 
member, had been the one most staunchly opposed to renegotiations of the 
Brasilia Protocol (Barral 2003). Although it was still engaging in negotiations 
on institutional reforms with some reservation in 2000,  
this hesitation disappeared the moment the fourth ruling was handed 
down. […] Up until then, Brazil had said: ‘The Brasilia Protocol is 
perfect, so we’re not going to change it.’ […] After this fourth case, 
Brazil was more open to negotiating with Argentina about amending 
the Protocol of Brasilia.24  
Brazil’s experience with the pre-Olivos DSS spurred on its search for more 
efficient institutional solutions:  
Reforms were a consequence of Brazil’s and Argentina’s decision to 
actually rely on the DSS for the settlement of disputes […]. As we 
started using the mechanism, new ideas on how to improve it ap-
peared, which then finally resulted in the negotiations.25  
While Paraguay and Uruguay had been willing to reform the DSS right from 
the start, given their underlying preference for a more legalized DSS, Argen-
tina and Brazil were only willing to commit to a more transnational form of 
dispute resolution as a result of the economic crisis and their problematic 
experience with the existing resolution system.  
Concerned about the high transaction costs of conflict resolution as 
well as its unintended distributional effects, member states introduced a 
number of well-defined institutional innovations.26 The first series of re-
forms addressed the independence of Mercosur’s DSS (see Table 1 above). 
                                                 
22  Authors’ interview 9, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011. 
23  Authors’ interview 16, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, March 2011. 
24  Authors’ interview 3, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011. 
25  Authors’ interview 15, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, March 2011. 
26  Decision CMC 25/00 contains the problems the national delegations identified at 
the outset of the negotiations. 
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The governments decided to equip judges in the newly established perma-
nent tribunal with a two-year tenure. The very first awards resulted in di-
verging interpretations of Mercosur legislation. The expectation was that 
judges with longer tenure would assure greater consistency in handing down 
rulings and would hence lower the transaction costs associated with arbitra-
tion. Permanent judges “ensure that there will be a tendency towards more 
legal consistency, at least during their tenure,” one government official re-
vealed.27 All sides consented on this issue; the national delegations negotiat-
ing the Protocol of Olivos never really debated this solution.28 
The possibility of reviewing rulings passed by the ad hoc tribunals rep-
resents an important advancement in the legal discretion of the DSS (Tussie, 
Labaqui, and Quiliconi 2001; Boldorini 2003). While Paraguay and Uruguay 
have always demanded a second instance in their pledge for a more suprana-
tional tribunal,29 the Argentinian and, in particular, the Brazilian delegations 
started to consider the option of judicial revision only in the light of the 
fourth case brought before an ad hoc tribunal (the “poultry case”). In the 
case in point, the ad hoc tribunal applied WTO rules on anti-dumping and 
handed down a ruling in favor of Argentina. Brazil was highly discontented 
with the ruling, and since there was no possibility of legal revision, it filed 
the case with the WTO – and won it this time (Sá Cabral and Lucarelli de 
Salvio 2008). In the light of this experience, all the member states expressed 
support for establishing a second instance within Mercosur, allowing a “los-
ing country another chance to argue against the ad hoc tribunal’s deci-
sion.”30 Similarly, the forum selection clause requires parties to agree to use 
a particular legal forum to settle their disputes, i.e., once they agree to use 
Mercosur’s DSS, they waive their right to “forum shop” outside the realm of 
Mercosur. This provision was based on Argentina’s and Brazil’s experience 
with the fourth ad hoc arbitration ruling and was intended to prevent com-
parable events from occurring in the future (Puceiro 2003). The member 
states essentially intended to lower the transaction costs of litigation with 
these provisions: once a dispute was settled in the realm of Mercosur, none 
of the parties had to fear renegotiations and possibly contradicting verdicts 
from another forum.31 
The Protocol of Olivos also explicitly introduced the opportunity to 
consult the new tribunal to obtain non-binding, consultative opinions. This 
                                                 
27  Authors’ interview 14, Uruguay, government official, Montevideo, March 2011. 
28  Authors’ interview 15, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, March 2011. 
29  Authors’ interview 9, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011. 
30  Authors’ interview 15, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, March 2011. 
31  Authors’ interview 2, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011; and authors’ 
interview 9, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011. 
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feature was also intended to lower the transaction costs of resolving dis-
putes. When Uruguay’s foreign minister Opperti suggested the innovation,  
[…] he thought this could be an important contribution. In the early 
stages of a conflict, consultative opinions would be insightful, already 
point to the solution, and thus avoid any further escalation of the dis-
pute.32  
Even though Brazil staunchly opposed this provision initially,33 it “finally 
liked the idea and made it go ahead,” an official said.34 
Additional innovations concern the standing of and access to Mer-
cosur’s DSS. The new rules make it easier for the parties to a conflict to 
circumvent diplomatic forums and file a case directly with an ad hoc tribu-
nal. All parties would need to consent to passing the resolution of a dispute 
over to the Common Market Group, whereas the parties may bring a case to 
an ad hoc tribunal unilaterally. The key arguments advanced to bring about 
this change relate, once again, to transaction-cost considerations:  
What happened in the controversies according to the rules of the Bra-
silia Protocol was that this instance – the Common Market Group – 
was not used much, because it did not help solve controversies, but 
only delayed the process. [… In the future, the Common Market 
Group] should solve controversies over principled questions rather 
than actual trade disputes.35  
In contrast, redirecting the cases to ad hoc tribunals seemed to be promis-
ing, since conflicting parties would now be able to delegate conflict settle-
ment directly to a third party and save transaction costs for litigation at an 
early stage.36 
According to the Protocol of Olivos, conflicting parties may unani-
mously decide to circumvent ad hoc tribunals and directly address the Per-
manent Review Tribunal for litigation – and not only as an instance of revi-
sion. This institutional provision originates in Uruguay’s and Paraguay’s 
efforts to install a strong supranational and permanent tribunal to prevent 
the two larger states from abusing their bargaining power:  
                                                 
32  Authors’ interview 11, Uruguay, ministry official, Montevideo, February 2011. 
33  “Brazil didn’t even understand the issue!” Authors’ interview 10, Argentina, minis-
try official, Buenos Aires, February 2011. 
34  Authors’ interview 15, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, March 2011. 
35  Authors’ interview 16, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, March 2011. 
36  Authors’ interview 12, Uruguay, ministry official, Montevideo, February 2011; and 
authors’ interview 10, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011. 
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Uruguay’s proposal of having a single court is reflected in Article 24 
of the Olivos Protocol, which permits direct access to the Permanent 
Review Tribunal. It was the result of a compromise: ‘We do not have 
a single court, but in case the countries come to an agreement, they 
can directly address the Permanent Review Tribunal as if it were 
one.’37  
The larger states found it easy to compromise on these terms, since the 
established rules would always allow them to veto the attempt to bring a 
case before the tribunal:  
At first, like other countries, we were against this option. Neverthe-
less, we finally agreed, because in order to use this instance, you need 
agreement from both parties – and Argentina thought ‘we’ll never 
consent anyway.’38 
Finally, Mercosur’s member states also introduced institutional innovations 
with regard to legal embeddedness. Even though compliance problems with 
the rulings handed down by ad hoc arbitration had not been an issue up to 
the negotiations, governments were eager to improve the existing procedure 
to pre-empt potential conflicts (Boldorini 2003). As one Argentinian gov-
ernment official voiced:  
The Brasilia Protocol said that if one party did not comply with a rul-
ing, the other party could suspend temporary concessions. Full stop. 
It did not say anything else. So what we did was to improve and de-
velop it a little bit more. When a country suspends concessions, they 
now have to be equivalent, proportional, and in the same sector.39  
The issue had already ranked prominently in the first road map for negotia-
tions, distributed by the Argentinian government during its presidency of 
Mercosur in the first half of 2000.40 Decision 25/00 made by the Common 
Market Council, which instructed the renegotiation of the DSS as part of the 
relaunch agenda in June 2000, contained a clear mandate to improve proce-
dures for the enforcement and monitoring of compliance.  
  
                                                 
37  Authors’ interview 9, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011. 
38  Authors’ interview 16, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, March 2011. 
39  Authors’ interview 16, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, March 2011. 
40  Authors’ interview 9, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011. 
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4.4 Robustness of Findings: Counterfactual Arguments 
and Alternative Explanations 
Our empirical evidence shows that Mercosur’s member states signaled their 
commitment to integration by advancing Mercosur’s legalization in response 
to the economic and financial crises in the later 1990s. Moreover, the con-
tent of the reform can be traced back to experiences with the pre-Olivos 
DSS and the concomitant insight gained by the governments of Argentina 
and Brazil that the transaction costs of litigating under the pre-Olivos rules 
were too high and had to be lowered. While we are aware of the fundamen-
tal problem of causal inference in social science, we are nevertheless con-
vinced that the outcome would have been different in the absence of one of 
these two conditions. We propose two counterfactual arguments to substan-
tiate our claims (Goertz and Levy 2007; Lebow 2010). Without the econom-
ic and financial crises at the turn of the millennium, the governments of 
Argentina and Brazil would not have considered the reform of Mercosur a 
priority and it is highly unlikely that sovereignty would have been delegated 
to the Mercosur level at this point in time. In our explanation above, we 
were able to show that the exogenous change in leaders’ strategic environ-
ments led to a shift in the strategies followed by political leaders. Functional 
demands alone, geared towards reducing the transaction costs of litigating, 
would not have led the governments of Argentina and Brazil to reconsider 
their stance towards further legalization. We conclude that the external 
“shock” induced from the economic and financial crises was necessary to 
place Mercosur on the agenda of political leaders in the four member states. 
Mercosur reform was thus seen as a means to help appease markets and 
head for more stable economic times. 
The members’ experiences with the existing institutional design are im-
portant to comprehend the content and scope of the legalization reforms. 
The member-state governments could have signaled their commitment to 
integration in Mercosur by focusing on other institutional changes; the re-
view of the DSS was only one of many reform options that governments 
had and implemented in the course of Mercosur’s relaunch in 2002. As 
mentioned above, Brazil changed its negotiation position with regard to 
legalization only after the ruling against it in the “poultry case.” Without the 
experience of this case, government officials would not have pressed their 
executive leaders to support substantial changes in the DSS. Both conditions 
were thus necessary to account for the timing, content, and scope of change – 
none of the factors alone is sufficient to explain the outcome. 
While we have presented evidence here corroborating our theoretical 
expectations, we also tested for alternative hypotheses to increase the 
amount of confidence in our findings. First of all, we turned to domestic 
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politics explanations, which addressed the sources of preference and/or 
strategy changes in domestic politics, such as changes in government. We 
can rule out preference or strategy changes as a result of changes in gov-
ernment. Even though Argentina and Paraguay changed their governments 
during the negotiations about Mercosur’s relaunch, the political parties con-
cerned did not display any different stances towards regional integration. At 
the turn of the millennium, “[…] the political changes at the national level 
[…] had no substantial effect on the government positions in the region 
with regard to Mercosur.”41 
Second, we were explicitly testing for the impact of domestic groups 
and the causal importance of their interests in a more (or less) legalized 
system of regional economic cooperation. From the perspective of liberal IR 
theory, domestic actors – most notably internationally competitive firms – 
ought to have the strongest incentive to lobby their governments to create 
international rules and institutions (see Moravcsik 1998; Mattli, 1999a and 
1999b; Tussie, Labaqui, and Quiliconi 2001). When the scope of markets 
increases beyond the boundaries of an individual nation state as a result of 
technological changes and concomitant increases in productivity and com-
petitiveness, “actors who stand to gain from wider markets will seek to 
change an existing governance structure in order to realize these gains to the 
fullest extent” (Mattli 1999b: 46). However, even though we explicitly asked 
about such influence in our interviews, we were unable to muster any sup-
porting evidence. While only one interviewee pointed generally at economic 
sector preferences in favor of a DSS offering more direct access to Mer-
cosur-level arbitration for private actors,42 societal actors did not articulate 
their interest in a systematic manner. All our interview partners denied any 
direct lobbying attempt on the part of this group of actors. 
Finally, we systematically tested for emulation as a consequence of so-
cialization. The institutional design of the DSS laid down in the Protocol of 
Olivos closely reflects the legalization preferences of the four member 
states. While Brazil and Argentina were skeptical about integration and 
sought to ensure that the new DSS would not become too “supranational,” 
Uruguay and Paraguay pressed for a more supranational dispute resolution 
system. The importance and sensitivity of the issue are reflected in the nego-
tiations on the Olivos Protocol, with negotiating officials frequently report-
ing back to their superiors to obtain instructions regarding the institutional 
                                                 
41  Caetano 2011: 39. On the similarity of positions on Mercosur that the Menem and 
de la Rua governments in Argentina had at the time, see Gomez-Mera 2013: 126ff. 
42  Authors’ interview 2, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011. 
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design of the new system.43 The Protocol of Olivos does not copy any par-
ticular model of dispute resolution, but rather combines elements of differ-
ent systems, reflecting the divergence in preferences for different levels of 
legalization. The result was “fortunate and constructive ambiguity”44 – in 
other words, the outcome neither follows any clear legal doctrine nor does it 
represent one negotiation position alone: “It attempts to reflect the different 
visions the member states can have about the same topic. This is why a lot 
of solutions did not primarily originate from legal concerns, but were the 
result of negotiations” (Puceiro 2003: 206. Authors’ own translation). Ar-
guments that point to diffusion dynamics whereby “epistemic networks” 
(see Lenz 2012, for example) spur the emulation of a supranational court 
with the ECJ serving as a role model appear largely unconvincing in the light 
of the evidence (also see Alter 2012). The delegations from the different 
member states proposed institutional design solutions that were closely 
aligned to their strategies supporting either moderate (Argentina, Brazil) or 
more extensive levels of legalization (Uruguay, Paraguay). Hence, while 
those governments pushing for a more legalized DSS made references to the 
EU’s DSS (and hence the ECJ), those favoring a less legalized DSS made 
references to the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism: “Brazil and Argen-
tina’s attitude was to look for improvements in the system and take the 
WTO as an example.”45 A Brazilian colleague corroborated this view, saying: 
“I believe there was strong influence from the WTO’s model […].”46 Dele-
gates from the two smaller countries considered the EU as a role model: 
“There was this wish from Uruguay and Paraguay to have something more 
similar to the EU.”47 Another Brazilian interview partner shared this per-
spective: “In Uruguay especially, there’s still this view from people who 
study the EU.”48 Not surprisingly, delegates from the two smaller countries 
shared these positions: “I think it [the Protocol of Olivos] is more inspired 
by the EU than by WTO.”49  
While evidence of the emulation of one particular model is scant, some 
of our interviewees questioned the relevance of (positive) emulation alto-
gether. Government officials may have been prone to compare the out-
                                                 
43  Authors’ interview 9, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011; 
authors’ interview 15, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, March 2011; authors’ inter-
view 8, Paraguay, government official, Asunción, February 2011; and authors’ in-
terview 11, Uruguay, ministry official, Montevideo, February 2011. 
44  Authors’ interview 12, Uruguay, ministry official, Montevideo, February 2011. 
45  Authors’ interview 10, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011. 
46  Authors’ interview 2, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011. 
47  Authors’ interview 15, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, March 2011. 
48  Authors’ interview 2, Brazil, ministry official, Brasilia, February 2011. 
49  Authors’ interview 8, Paraguay, government official, Asunción, February 2011. 
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comes of the institutional design choice of Mercosur’s DSS with other mod-
els ex post facto, but there is evidence that they did not intend to simply 
“copy” dispute settlement mechanisms from other organizations. Even 
though institutional elements of the new DSS may have certain features of 
the EU’s own resolution system, the causal effect – i.e., non-spurious emula-
tion – has yet to be established. This means that institutional similarities are 
not necessarily due to any deliberate copying:  
People who negotiated and discussed might swear they did not know 
about the WTO. […] But you can clearly realize that the appellate 
body of WTO is very present in the idea of an arbitral appellation tri-
bunal.50  
Finally, for emulation to be successful, the actors negotiating the new insti-
tutions for Mercosur’s DSS should possess or develop a common outlook 
regarding the most effective or appropriate design. According to our inter-
viewees, no common vision or interpretation about the most effective or 
appropriate DSS arose during the negotiations. Even though delegates to 
the negotiations admitted that they began to develop mutual trust and ami-
cable relations, we have no evidence of any socialization effects that could 
have supported an endogenous preference change. Two interviewees partic-
ipating in the negotiations reported about the atmosphere in a particularly 
illustrative way: “There was a friendly atmosphere, and you could speak 
openly. But still, [the representatives’] positions remained distinct.”51 A 
colleague from Argentina put it in even more metaphorical language: “They 
were all close friends of ours. I mean, they were friends until we engaged in 
discussions. Then we’d draw our swords and fight!”52 
5 Conclusion 
In the descriptive part of this paper, we demonstrated that the Olivos re-
forms marked a significant break with the previous system of dispute set-
tlement, which contained strong intergovernmental features. We explained 
the initial preferences regarding legalization on the part of the Mercosur 
governments as a consequence of their countries’ different levels of eco-
nomic strength and interdependence. Uruguay and Paraguay had long 
pushed for a more legalized DSS because they feared the domination of the 
two more powerful members, Argentina and Brazil. Moreover, with higher 
                                                 
50  Authors’ interview 7, Brazil, ministry official, Asunción, February 2011. 
51  Authors’ interview 11, Uruguay, ministry official, Montevideo, February 2011. 
52  Authors’ interview 9, Argentina, ministry official, Buenos Aires, February 2011. 
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intraregional trade shares, Uruguay and Paraguay benefitted more from 
unhindered economic transactions within the region than Argentina and 
Brazil. In contrast to Uruguay and Paraguay, the two larger Mercosur part-
ners were economically less dependent on intraregional trade and preferred 
a less legalized DSS, since they expected to be able to realize their interests 
in diplomatic negotiations in a better way than through institutionalized 
forms of third-party dispute settlement. In the light of the initial reluctance 
of the Brazilian and Argentinian governments to support any advances in 
legalization, we offered a two-tiered explanation of the demand for and 
supply of a more legalized dispute resolution system. First, Argentina and 
Brazil, which were initially opposed to stepping up the level of legalization, 
were in favor of more efficient institutions for litigation, given their experi-
ence with the pre-Olivos system of dispute resolution. Moreover, the eco-
nomic and financial crises experienced in the late 1990s induced the Mer-
cosur governments to signal their commitment to the integration project. 
Delegating (small) portions of sovereignty by empowering the DSS was 
considered a credible (but costly) signal to transnational economic actors 
and international capital owners that their investments in the region would 
be legally secure and profitable. 
We have presented a comprehensive explanation of legalization here, 
highlighting preferences, timing, and the content of institutional change. By 
taking recourse to insights from contracting theory (Cooley and Spruyt 
2009), externality theory (Mattli 1999a, 1999b; Mattli and Stone Sweet 2012), 
and rationalist theories about learning, and applying process tracing meth-
odology, we were able to show how different causal mechanisms – signaling 
commitment during crises and revising beliefs in order to render existing 
institutions more functional – interrelate so as to draw a more complete 
picture of the timing and content of DSS reforms. While contracting theory 
offers convincing accounts of actors’ preferences for legalization, changing 
economic environments induce political leaders to modify their strategies 
regarding regional cooperation and opt for more transnational forms of 
conflict resolution (Mattli 1999a). We have argued that the crises of the late 
1990s acted as a catalyst for Mercosur reform and made governments reas-
sess their strategies for achieving regional integration. Signaling commitment 
to further integration in Mercosur was thus a direct response to the eco-
nomic crisis, yet it does not explain the choice of the respective institutional 
innovations in the DSS. To this end, we argued that legalization rose to the 
top of the reform agenda because the Mercosur governments – especially 
Argentina and Brazil, the more skeptical members – revised their views 
about the pre-Olivos DSS once they had experienced the first series of cases 
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and rulings; judging the system to be deficient, they agreed to a relatively 
wide-ranging reform agenda.  
In this context, we have also shown that one should not overstate the 
explanatory power of emulation or diffusion arguments and be too quick in 
dismissing functional arguments and pressures geared towards lowering the 
transaction costs of existing institutional arrangements. Having tested these 
different mechanisms, we found that in the reform of Mercosur’s DSS, the 
actors learned about the effects of the initial institutional design and devel-
oped a detailed road map for reform to overcome perceived deficiencies in 
the existing institutional setup. 
References 
Abbott, Kenneth, and Duncan Snidal (2013), Law, Legalization and Politics: 
An Agenda for the Next Generation of IR-IL Scholars, in: Jeffrey 
Dunoff and Marc Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International 
Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 33–58. 
Akerlof, George (1970), The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and 
the Market Mechanism, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 3, 488–
500. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal (1995), Partisan Politics, Divided 
Government and the Economy, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Alter, Karen (2012), The Global Spread of European Style International 
Courts, in: West European Politics, 35, 1, 135–154. 
Alter, Karen (2008), Delegating to International Courts: Self-binding vs. 
Other-binding Delegation, in: Law and Contemporary Problems, 71, 4, 37–
76. 
Barral, Welber (2003), As Innovações Processuais do Protocolo de Olivos, 
in: Solução de Controvérsias no Mercosul, Brasília: Camara dos Deputados, 
233–247. 
Boldorini, Maria Cristina (2003), Protocolo de Olivos: Innovaciones en el 
Sistema de Solución de Controversias del Mercosur, in: Solução de Con-
trovérsias no Mercosul, Brasília: Camara dos Deputados, 114–150. 
Borensztein, Eduardo, José de Gregorio, and Jong-Wha Lee (1998), How 
Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?, in: Journal 
of International Economics, 45, 1, 115–135. 
Bouzas, Roberto (2001), El Mercosur Diez Años Después ¿Proceso de 
Aprendizaje o Déjà Vu?, in: Desarrollo Economico, 41, 1, 179–200. 
  
  30 Christian Arnold and Berthold Rittberger 
 
Büthe, Tim, and Helen V. Milner (2008), The Politics of Foreign Direct 
Investment Into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI Through In-
ternational Trade Agreements?, in: American Journal of Political Science, 52, 
4, 741–762. 
Caetano, Gerardo (2011), Breve Historia del MERCOSUR En Sus 20 Años. 
Coyunturas e Institutiones (1991-2011), in: Gerardo Caetano (ed.), Mer-
cosur: 20 Años, Montevideo: CEFIR, 21–74. 
Cooley, Alexander, and Hendrik Spruyt (2009), Contracting States: Sovereign 
Transfers in International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
de Klor, Adriana Dreyzin (2003), El Protocolo de Olivos, in: Revista de 
Derecho Privado y Comunitario, 2, 1, 618–646. 
De Lima, Maria Regina Soares, and Mônica Hirst (2006), Brazil as an Inter-
mediate State and Regional Power: Action, Choice and Responsibilities, 
in: International Affairs, 82, 1, 21–40. 
de Mello, Luiz Jr. (1997), Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Coun-
tries and Growth: A Selective Survey, in: The Journal of Development Stud-
ies, 34, 1 1–34. 
Dobbin, Frank, Beth Simmons, and Geoffrey Garrett (2007), The Global 
Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competi-
tion, or Learning, in: Annual Review of Sociology, 33, 449–472. 
Doctor, Mahrukh (2012), Prospects for Deepening Mercosur Integration: 
Economic Asymmetry and Institutional Deficits, in: Review of Internation-
al Political Economy, 20, 3, 515–540. 
Duch, Raymond, and Randolph Stevenson (2008), The Economic Vote: How 
Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results, New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Duina, Francesco (2006), The Social Construction of Free Trade: The European 
Union, NAFTA, and MERCOSUR, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth Simmons (2006), Compet-
ing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–
2000, in: International Organization, 60, 4, 811–846. 
Fearon, James (1997), Signalling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Ver-
sus Sinking Costs, in: Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41, 1, 68–90. 
Fontoura, Jorge (2003), A Evolução do Sistema de Solução de Controvérsi-
as: De Brasília a Olivos, in: Solução de Controvérsias no Mercosul, Brasília: 
Cámara dos Deputados, 271–278. 
Frieden, Jeffry (1999), Actors and Preferences in International Relations, in: 
David A. Lake and Robert Powell (eds), Strategic Choice and International 
Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 39–76. 
 The Legalization of Dispute Resolution in Mercosur 31 
 
Frieden, Jeffry, and Lisa Martin (2002), International Political Economy: 
Global and Domestic Interactions, in: Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner 
(eds), Political Science: The State of the Discipline, New York: W. W. Norton 
& Co, 118–146. 
Garabelli, Carlos Alberto González (2004), Procesos de Integración. Mercosur. 
Solución de Controversias, Asunción: Centro Interdisciplinario de Derecho 
Social y Economía Política de la Universidad Católica ‘Nuestra Señora 
de la Asunción’. 
George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett (2005), Case Studies and Theory De-
velopment in the Social Sciences, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Gilardi, Fabrizio (2010), Who Learns from What in Policy Diffusion Pro-
cesses?, in: American Journal of Political Science, 54, 3, 650–666. 
Goertz, Gary, and Jack S. Levy (2007), Explaining War and Peace. Case Studies 
and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals, Abingdon: Routledge. 
Goldstein, Judith, and Joanne Gowa (2002), US National Power and the 
Post-War Trading Regime, in: World Trade Review, 1, 2, 153–170. 
Gomez-Mera, Laura (2013), Power and Regionalism in Latin America: The Politics 
of Mercosur, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Gomez-Mera, Laura (2009), Domestic Constraints on Regional Coopera-
tion: Explaining Trade Conflict in MERCOSUR, in: Review Of Interna-
tional Political Economy, 16, 5, 746–777. 
Keohane, Robert (1984), After Hegemony, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Keohane, Robert, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2000), 
Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, in: Interna-
tional Organization, 54, 3, 457–488. 
Koremenos, Barbara, and Timm Betz (2013), The Design of Dispute Set-
tlement Procedures in International Agreements, in: Jeffrey Dunoff and 
Marc Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and In-
ternational Relations: The State of the Art, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 371–393. 
Krapohl, Sebastian, Julia Dinkel, and Benjamin Faude (2010), Judicial Inte-
gration in the Americas? A Comparison of Dispute Settlement in 
NAFTA and MERCOSUR, in: Finn Laursen (ed.), Comparative Regional 
Integration: Europe and Beyond, Aldershot: Ashgate, 169–192. 
Lagendijk, Arnoud, and Bas Hendrikx (2009), Foreign Direct Investment, in: 
Rob Kitchin and Nigel Thrift (eds), International Encyclopedia of Human 
Geography, Volume 1, Oxford: Elsevier, 243–254. 
Lebow, Richard Ned (2010), Forbidden Fruit. Counterfactuals and International 
Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
  32 Christian Arnold and Berthold Rittberger 
 
Lehmann, Julia (2001), Neues von der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit des Mercosur: 
Ein Integrationsmotor à la Luxemburg?, in: Europäische Zeitschrift für 
Wirtschaftsrecht, 20, 622–625. 
Lenz, Tobias (2012), Spurred Emulation: The EU and Regional Integration 
in Mercosur and SADC, in: West European Politics, 35, 1, 155–173. 
Lipson, Charles (1985), Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nine-
teenth and Twentieth Centuries, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Malamud, Andrés (2005), Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Un-
derpinnings of Mercosur, in: Latin American Research Review, 40, 1, 138–
164. 
Malamud, Andrés (2011), A Leader Without Followers? The Growing Di-
vergence Between the Regional and Global Performance of Brazilian 
Foreign Policy, in: Latin American Politics and Society, 53, 3, 1–24. 
Margheritis, Ana, and Anthony W. Pereira (2007), The Neoliberal Turn in 
Latin America: The Cycle of Ideas and the Search for an Alternative, in: 
Latin American Perspectives, 34, 3, 25–48. 
Mattli, Walter (1999a), The Logic of Regional Integration. Europe and Beyond, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mattli, Walter (1999b), Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes, in: Jour-
nal of European Public Policy, 6, 1, 1–27. 
Mattli, Walter, and Alec Stone Sweet (2012), Regional Integration and the 
Evolution of the European Polity: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
Journal of Common Market Studies, in: Journal of Common Market Stud-
ies, 50, 1, 1–17. 
Meseguer, Covadonga (2006), Rational Learning and Bounded Learning in 
the Diffusion of Policy Innovations, in: Rationality and Society, 18, 1, 35–
66. 
Montecinos, Verónica (1996), Ceremonial Regionalism, Institutions and 
Integration in the Americas, in: Studies in Comparative International Devel-
opment, 31, 2, 110–123. 
Moraes, Henrique Choer (2002), O Novo Sistema Jurisdicional do Mercosul 
(Um Primeiro Olhar Sobre o Protocolo de Olivos), in: Revista de Direito 
Constitucional e Internacional, 10, 57–71. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1998), The Choice for Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Norpoth, Helmut, Michael Lewis-Beck, and Jean-Dominique Lafay (eds) 
(1991), Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support, Ann Arbor: Univer-
sity of Michigan Press. 
Ostrom, Elinor (1998), A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice The-
ory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Sci-
ence Association, 1997, in: American Political Science Review, 92, 1, 1–22.  
 The Legalization of Dispute Resolution in Mercosur 33 
 
Perotti, Alejandro Daniel (2001), Proyecto de Reformas al Protocolo de 
Brasília. Una Nueva Oportunidad Perdida?, in: Revista Derecho del Mer-
cosur, 5, 2, 135–147. 
Pimentel, Luís Otávio, and Adriana Dreyzin de Klor (2004), O Sistema de 
Solução de Controvérsias do Mercosul, in: Adriana Dreyzin de Klor, 
Luiz Otávio Pimentel, Patricia Luíza Kegel, and Welber Barral (eds), 
Solução de Controversias. OMC, União Européia e Mercosul, Rio de Janeiro: 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 141–235. 
Pollack, Mark (1997), Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the Euro-
pean Community, in: International Organization, 51, 1, 99–134. 
Puceiro, Roberto (2003), El Protocolo de Olivos: Sus Reformas Esenciales y 
su Significado en el Regimen de Solución de Controversias del Mer-
cosur, in: Solução de Controvérsias no Mercosul, Brasília: Camara dos Depu-
tados, 189–209. 
Quijano, José Manuel (2005), Mercosur: ¿El Relanzamiento?, in: Nueva Socie-
dad, 199, 53–58. 
Rubinstein, Ariel (1991), Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory, 
in: Econometrica, 59, 4, 909–924. 
Sá Cabral, Jeanine Gama, and Gabriella Giovanna Lucarelli de Salvio (2008), 
Considerations on the Mercosur Dispute Settlement Mechanism and 
the Impact of Its Decisions in the WTO Dispute Resolution System, in: 
Journal of World Trade, 42, 6, 1013–1040. 
Simmons, Beth, and Allison Danner (2010), Credible Commitments and the 
International Criminal Court, in: International Organization, 64, 1, 225–
256. 
Simmons, Beth, Frank Dobbin and Geoffrey Garrett (2006), Introduction: 
The International Diffusion of Liberalism, in: International Organization, 
60, 4, 781–810. 
Spektor, Matias (2010), Brazil: The Underlying Ideas of Regional Policies, in: 
Daniel Flemes (ed.), Regional Leadership in the Global System – Ideas, Inter-
ests and Strategies of Regional Powers, Farnham: Ashgate, 191–204. 
Stone, Alec (1994), What Is a Supranational Constitution? An Essay in In-
ternational Relations Theory, in: Review of Politics, 56, 2, 441–474. 
Stone Sweet, Alec (2010), The European Court of Justice and the Judiciali-
zation of EU Governance, in: Living Reviews in EU Governance, 5, 2, 1–
50. 
Taccone, Juan José, and Uziel Nogueira (2002), Mercosur Report Nr. 8, Bue-
nos Aires: BID-INTAL. 
Taccone, Juan José, and Uziel Nogueira (2001), Mercosur Report Nr. 7, Bue-
nos Aires: BID-INTAL. 
  34 Christian Arnold and Berthold Rittberger 
 
Tansey, Oisín (2007), Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for 
Non-probability Sampling, in: Political Science and Politics, 40, 4, 765–772. 
Tussie, Diana, Ignacio Labaqui, and Cintia Quiliconi (2001), Disputas Co-
merciales e Insuficiencias Institucionales: ¿De la Experiencia a la Ez-
peranza?, in: Daniel Chudnovski and José María Fanelli (eds), El Desafío 
de Integrarse para Crecer: Balance y Perspectivas del Mercosur en su Primera Dé-
cada, Buenos Aires: BID-INTAL, 205–225. 
Vinuesa, Raul Emilio (2005), Enforcement of Mercosur Arbitration Awards 
within the Domestic Legal Orders of Member States, in: Texas Interna-
tional Law Journal, 40, 425–442. 
Vigevani, Tullo, and Gabriel Cepaluni (2009), Brazilian Foreign Policy in Chang-
ing Times, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Volden, Craig, Michael Ting, and Daniel P. Carpenter (2008), A Formal 
Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion, in: American Political Science Re-
view, 102, 3, 319–332. 
 
 
  
 The Legalization of Dispute Resolution in Mercosur 35 
 
Appendix 
Table 2:  List of Interview Partners 
Name Function Country 
Santiago Delucca Former Secretary PRC Argentina 
Marina García Member of the delegation to the Olivos 
negotiations 
Argentina 
Enrique Mantilla Head of Chamber of Foreign Trade Argentina 
Valentina Raffo Member of the delegation to the Olivos 
negotiations 
Argentina 
Suzana Czar de 
Zalduendo 
Member of the delegation to the Olivos 
negotiations 
Argentina 
Welber Barral Former Secretary of the Ministry of In-
dustry, Development and Commerce 
Brazil 
Carlos Marcio 
Cozendey 
Coordinator of Mercosur affairs during 
the Olivos negotiations, Ministry of For-
eign Affairs 
Brazil 
Jorge Fontoura Judge PRC Brazil 
Celso Pereira Member of the delegation to the Olivos 
negotiations 
Brazil 
Grandino Rodas Former legal advisor of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs during the Olivos negoti-
ations; former PRC Judge 
Brazil 
Dr. Rosinha Member of Parliament (Brazil and Mer-
cosur) 
Brazil 
Carlos Alberto 
Gonzales Garabelli 
Former legal advisor of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs during the Olivos negoti-
ations; member of the delegation to the 
Olivos negotiations 
Paraguay 
José Antonio 
Moreno Ruffinelli 
Minister of Foreign Affairs during the 
Olivos negotiations; former PRC judge 
Paraguay 
Eric Salum Member of Parliament (Mercosur) Paraguay 
Sergio Abreu Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Uruguay 
Didier Opertti 
Badan 
Minister of Foreign Affairs during the 
Olivos negotiations 
Uruguay 
Roberto Puceiro Legal advisor to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs during the Olivos negotiations; 
member of the delegation to the Olivos 
negotiations 
Uruguay 
Fernando Reyes First Secretary of Mercosur Secretariat Uruguay 
Source:  Authors’ own compilation. 
 
  36 Christian Arnold and Berthold Rittberger 
 
La Legalización de la Solución de Controversias en el Mercosur 
Resumen: El Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur), el cuarto bloque eco-
nómico del mundo, es un caso de integración regional intrigante, pero poco 
estudiado. En las décadas pasadas llevó a cabo avances importantes en su 
estructura institucional, sobretodo en la legalización de la solución de con-
troversias. Hasta 2002, los miembros resolvieron conflictos á través de ne-
gociaciones diplomáticas y tribunales ad-hoc que gozaron de poca indepen-
dencia de los gobiernos miembros. Los miembros entonces introdujeron 
reformas que avanzaron el nivel de la legalización: instalaron un tribunal 
permanente con más independencia y facilitaron el acceso a su jurisdicción. 
Para explicar este cambio importante hacia más legalización del Mercosur, 
presentamos explicaciones racional-institucionalistas para los niveles preferi-
dos de la legalización (por qué), para el timing de las reformas (cuándo) y para el 
carácter institucional de las reformas (cómo). 
Palabras clave: Legalización, Solucción de Controversias, Mercosur 
 
